**Cyber ADV CP**

**1NC---OFF**

**T-12 CP:**

**The United States federal government should coordinate a T-12 technology organization with France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, South Korea, Finland, Sweden, India and Israel in the area of [plan].**

**T-12 solves.**

**Cohen** and Fontaine **20** [Jared Cohen, former member of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. He currently serves as CEO of Jigsaw and is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain; 11-2020; "Uniting the Techno-Democracies"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/uniting-techno-democracies; KL]

Just as the G-7 came to guide multilateral action among the world’s leading economies, a set of **techno-democracies**—countries with top technology sectors, advanced economies, and a commitment to liberal democracy—must **take action** on **contemporary digital** issues. So far, these leading states have acted independently, but their combined market power and national strength would make them a **potent unified force**.

For now, **12** countries stand out for inclusion in such a group. The United States is arguably still the world’s leading technological power, and **France**, **Germany**, **Japan**, and the **U**nited **K**ingdom all have large economies and impressive technology sectors. **Australia**, **Canada**, and **South Korea** have smaller economies, but they are also important players in technology. The same is true of **Finland** and **Sweden**, which are telecommunications and engineering powerhouses. **India** and **Israel** are also logical candidates for membership, owing to the global reach of their flourishing technology and startup sectors.

Given the **deep need** for coordination among like-minded states, this “T-12” group of techno-democracies would fill a **yawning gap** in modern technological and geopolitical competition. The T-12’s members would undoubtedly disagree on many issues, but the group could provide a critical venue for them to air their grievances. The United States, in particular, should welcome the participation of others, since their presence at the negotiating table would not only improve its **digital advantage** but also reduce the sense among these countries that they are **merely pawns**, rather than partners, in a U.S.-Chinese superpower competition.

The **most logical** structure for the T-12 is an **informal** group of states, not a secretariat-laden international organization or an alliance with a **mutual defense** agreement. Although critics often dismiss gatherings such as the G-20 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation as once-a-year opportunities for heads of state to gather for a few hours, don an ethnically unique shirt, jawbone, and take a group photo, this is a misleading stereotype. Such groupings have in fact been **highly effective** at marshaling **multilateral action**.

**1NC---Cohen---Full Article**

Here’s the full article in case you want to cut it differently.

There are also repeats of cards because a lot of them are multi-use.

**Full article**

**Cohen** and Fontaine **20** [Jared Cohen, former member of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. He currently serves as CEO of Jigsaw and is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain; 11-2020; "Uniting the Techno-Democracies"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/uniting-techno-democracies]

At the outset of the digital age, democracies seemed ascendant. The United States and like-minded countries were at the cutting edge of technological development. Policymakers were pointing to the inherently liberalizing effect of the Internet, which seemed a threat to dictators everywhere. The United States’ technological advantage made its military more potent, its economy more prosperous, and its democracy, at least in theory, more vibrant.

Since then, autocratic states have caught up. China is at the forefront, no longer a mere rising power in technology and now an American peer. In multiple areas—including facial and voice recognition, 5G technology, digital payments, quantum communications, and the commercial drone market—it has surpassed the United States. Leaders in Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Venezuela, and elsewhere are increasingly using technology for illiberal ends, following China’s example. And despite the United States’ remaining advantage in some technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor production, it has fallen behind China in formulating an overall strategy for their use.

Almost in parallel, the United States and its allies have stepped away from their tradition of collaboration. Instead of working together on issues of common interest, they have been pulled apart by diverging national interests and have responded incoherently to autocratic states’ co-optation of new technologies. Although officials in most democratic capitals now acknowledge the profound ways in which new technologies are shaping the world, they remain strangely disconnected from one another when it comes to managing them. Coordination, when it occurs, is sporadic, reactive, and ad hoc.

The liberal democracies are running out of time to get their act together: whoever shapes the use of emerging technologies such as AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, and next-generation telecommunications will have an economic, military, and political advantage for decades to come. But the world’s advanced democracies have something the autocracies don’t: a long history of multilateral cooperation for the benefit of all.

Because the issues are so diverse, what’s needed now is not more piecemeal solutions but an overarching forum in which like-minded countries can come together to hammer out joint responses. This new grouping of leading “techno-democracies”—call it the T-12, given the logical list of members—would help democracies regain the initiative in global technology competition. It would allow them to promote their preferred norms and values around the use of emerging technologies and preserve their competitive advantage in key areas. Above all, it would help coordinate a unified response to a chief threat to the global order.

AUTOCRACIES IN THE LEAD

Washington has struggled to develop a coherent vision to guide its global technological role, but many autocracies have not. China, in particular, has recognized that the existing rules of the international order were largely written in a predigital age and that it has an opportunity to write fresh ones. Already, Beijing is pursuing this goal by quickly building top-notch capabilities and deploying them throughout the global market, especially in areas where the U.S. presence is weak or virtually nonexistent. In Zimbabwe, for instance, the Chinese AI company CloudWalk is helping develop a national facial recognition system, giving the local government a powerful new tool for political control.

But forward-looking efforts such as these are not solely unilateral. China, Russia, and other autocracies are already coordinating around a self-interested global vision. They are shaping standards for the use of new technologies in exclusive groups such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose members have agreed to collaborate on information security, robotics, and e-commerce, among other areas. They also work through global forums such as the International Telecommunication Union, where some of the same countries have supported international standards that facilitate unaccountable surveillance. Unlike many liberal democracies, quite a few autocracies have realized that technology, including the power to innovate, set norms for its use, and shape the institutions that decide how it will be employed, is not simply a niche functional issue buried in a crowded foreign policy agenda; it is a central element of modern geopolitical competition.

The United States, on the other hand, has been mostly reactive. China’s rapid progress in 5G, AI, and quantum communications has stumped multiple U.S. administrations. Washington has no easy answer to China’s so-called Digital Silk Road, an array of technological infrastructure projects to accompany the construction projects of its Belt and Road Initiative, nor does it have an answer to the country’s campaign to establish a digital currency. The United States and its allies have consistently struggled to define the rules of engagement around cyberattacks and have responded inadequately to the use of technologies by autocracies to oppress their people. U.S. officials often complain about Beijing’s dominance in technical standard setting and allies’ deferential attitude toward Chinese infrastructure. But they have had a difficult time changing the nature of the game.

This is a multinational failure. Liberal democracies around the world simply do not work together on many of the issues that should unite them. Their responses to autocracies’ abuse of technology tend to be fragmented. National interests diverge, disagreements among states arise, and nothing gets done. Within countries, paralysis often occurs as domestic authorities clash with their national security counterparts over how to deal with election meddling, disinformation, and hacking. Instead of pursuing broad collaboration, the liberal democracies have come up with a patchwork of discrete responses: Canada and France’s collaboration on an expert panel tasked with monitoring developments in AI policy, for example, or NATO’s pursuit of a cyber-deterrence doctrine.

The dispute over the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei’s 5G capabilities is perhaps the best example of democracies’ inconsistent response. Following Australia’s initial lead, the United States took a hard line against the company, banning Huawei components from its national 5G network and forbidding U.S. entities from doing business of any sort with it. The United States proceeded to insist that other democracies follow suit, even threatening to withhold critical intelligence from allies if they adopted Huawei products. Still, Washington remains relatively isolated in its opposition. Many governments continue to resist U.S. pressure, pointing out that there is no low-cost, one-stop-shop alternative to Huawei’s technology. Even Canada and South Korea, close U.S. allies, have defied Washington and are considering Huawei equipment for their 5G infrastructure.

The democracies have come up with a similarly disjointed response to Russia’s election meddling. Although the Kremlin has interfered in the elections of multiple countries, the problem has largely been treated as a national one, deserving of only a unilateral response from any given target. When Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, only the United States responded with punitive measures. Likewise, Russia’s reported meddling in this year’s U.S. presidential election has so far not produced any unified reaction. Compare that to the response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its poisoning of a former intelligence officer and his daughter in the United Kingdom. In those cases, the major democracies coordinated a joint response, imposing new sanctions and expelling Russian diplomats.

FROM MANY, ONE

Although the democracies currently suffer from a deficit of cooperation, their capacity to work together endures. Here, history offers useful guidance. In 1973, U.S. Treasury Secretary George Shultz convened the finance ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany in the White House library for informal talks. This “Library Group” quickly added Japan to become the G-5 and later included first Italy and then Canada to become the G-7. In the decades that followed, this informal group of advanced liberal democracies, which for 16 years included Russia as the G-8, would emerge as a powerful international force. Among other issues, the group coordinated its members’ responses to 9/11 and to the 2008 global financial crisis.

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For now, 12 countries stand out for inclusion in such a group. The United States is arguably still the world’s leading technological power, and France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom all have large economies and impressive technology sectors. Australia, Canada, and South Korea have smaller economies, but they are also important players in technology. The same is true of Finland and Sweden, which are telecommunications and engineering powerhouses. India and Israel are also logical candidates for membership, owing to the global reach of their flourishing technology and startup sectors.

Given the deep need for coordination among like-minded states, this “T-12” group of techno-democracies would fill a yawning gap in modern technological and geopolitical competition. The T-12’s members would undoubtedly disagree on many issues, but the group could provide a critical venue for them to air their grievances. The United States, in particular, should welcome the participation of others, since their presence at the negotiating table would not only improve its digital advantage but also reduce the sense among these countries that they are merely pawns, rather than partners, in a U.S.-Chinese superpower competition.

The most logical structure for the T-12 is an informal group of states, not a secretariat-laden international organization or an alliance with a mutual defense agreement. Although critics often dismiss gatherings such as the G-20 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation as once-a-year opportunities for heads of state to gather for a few hours, don an ethnically unique shirt, jawbone, and take a group photo, this is a misleading stereotype. Such groupings have in fact been highly effective at marshaling multilateral action.

In the wake of 9/11, for instance, G-8 summits produced specific commitments to prevent a repeat attack. It is thanks to the actions taken then that modern commercial aircraft have hardened cockpit doors, major international ports screen cargo containers for dangerous materials, and nations restrict the export of portable surface-to-air missiles. The G-8 was also at the forefront of public health efforts. In 2001, the group established the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which has saved millions of lives through investments in research and global health programs. And after the 2008 financial crisis, the G-20 committed to a $5 trillion stimulus package and proposed new financial regulations, helping contain the subsequent recession’s damage and prevent another crash.

The government leaders or ministers who meet as the T-12 would also have a unique opportunity to enlist the private sector and international organizations in their work. Annual meetings could serve as an arena for business leaders to join government officials in coordinating responses to emerging issues such as the need to improve remote-learning technology in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and what the future of counterterrorism might look like. The format for these meetings could include issue-based sessions, in which governments invite leading private-sector figures for focused discussions, or standing forums akin to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s Business Advisory Council, which provides advice to Pacific Rim leaders on concerns facing businesses throughout the region. The T-12 could also develop working groups and committees on the multistakeholder model, which brings together representatives from business, civil society, government, and research institutions. These groups would then pass recommendations up to ministers and principals. Simultaneously, leaders could collaborate with other multilateral organizations—working with NATO on AI security, for instance, or with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on the industrial implications of disruptive technologies.

AN INITIAL AGENDA

The success of the T-12 will inevitably hinge on its ability to translate its conceptual appeal into the nuts and bolts of executing a real agenda. One task its members could start with is information sharing. Within the T-12, governments could update one another on the security of supply chains, particularly in critical sectors such as semiconductors, where China aims to dramatically reduce the portion of the market currently controlled by American, Dutch, and Japanese firms. They could conduct audits of supply chains that cross international boundaries, especially those that include Chinese-made components or software. Members could compare their assessments of the risks of China’s 5G technology, examine advances in quantum computing, investigate AI safety, and share strategies for preventing the theft of intellectual property. In a more ambitious step, they could exchange information about online propaganda, disinformation, the integrity of academic research, and specific ways in which autocratic regimes employ technology to erode liberal democracy.

Setting standards for the use of emerging technologies would be another crucial job for the T-12. The countries and companies producing the most advanced technology have a valuable first-mover advantage: they can set guidelines for how they expect their products to be used. Facial recognition software would be a good test case for the T-12’s potential on this front. This technology is already being used for surveillance purposes, including by the Chinese government to monitor Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang and by Moscow to link photographs with social media accounts. The leading democracies have yet to agree on rules for using facial recognition technology, including its proper role in the criminal justice system, or the protocols that should govern data collection. The T-12 could address this by exploring how such technology could be used to secure large events or assist in law enforcement investigations, but not as a means of social control or mass intimidation.

Autocracies have realized that technology is a central element of modern geopolitical competition.

Beyond helping the democracies get on the same page as they compete with China, the T-12 could also serve as a way for members to air differences within the group itself. Europeans might object, for instance, to the fact that Israel’s NSO Group, a controversial technology firm known for its spyware products, sells smartphone surveillance tools to autocracies, and the Americans may disagree with the EU’s focus on privacy when it infringes on free expression. The democracies have varied approaches to data protection, privacy, and free speech. The T-12 would allow them to explore these differences, with the ultimate aim of establishing broad principles, understanding disagreements, and narrowing the gaps between participants.

Coordinating investments would represent another natural function of the T-12. Members could rationalize their allocation of resources to innovation and R & D and to securing supply chains. They could even make concrete financial commitments to counter China’s Digital Silk Road and 5G capabilities and launch joint projects in such areas as quantum computing, cybersecurity, and tools for detecting AI-generated counterfeit images or videos known as “deepfakes.” In the realm of more speculative technologies, it could examine advances in 3-D printing, potentially unbreakable encryption methods based on quantum mechanics, and microscopic sensing technology. More ambitious still, it might launch a joint fund to extend loans and loan guarantees to developing nations that seek trusted 5G equipment and other technology that accords with liberal values.

Finally, the T-12 could serve as a forum for coordinating policy. Members might harmonize their export controls on cyber-surveillance tools; regulate the use of blockchain, a digital ledger of global transactions, to ensure the integrity of supply chains when it comes to sectors such as defense manufacturing and medical equipment; generate common standards for a variety of 3-D printing methods; and even coordinate their education and immigration policies to develop and retain top technology talent. More broadly, the T-12 should articulate a vision of the future based on innovation, freedom, democratic collaboration, and liberal values.

BIGGER AND BOLDER

Over time, the T-12 could expand and transform, just as the G-5 became the G-7 and then, temporarily, the G-8. Starting with the initial 12, the T-12 should aim for around 20 members within five years. Additional individual European states, such as Italy and the Netherlands, could be asked to join, without the complexity of including the European Union itself as a member. In Latin America, Brazil and Chile would make obvious candidates, and in Africa, members could include Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. Taiwan would also be a useful participant, even if creative diplomacy might be required to deal with the island’s nonstate status.

The T-12’s agenda should similarly grow in ambition. Moving beyond its initial objectives, the group could branch out into securing the supply chains for semiconductors. Doing so would involve multilateral export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and technology, an area in which the techno-democracies have a significant lead over China and others. As part of this effort, they could create an international chip fabrication consortium to move semiconductor production out of China and into a T-12 country and provide shared financing for the billions of dollars such a move would require. And as the world faces diminishing returns in the growth of computing power due to the physical limits of existing materials, the group could launch joint R & D projects devoted to a new generation of microelectronics that might jump-start an increase in computing power again.

Technology is too important to be left to the technologists.

As its portfolio grows, the T-12 should also take a multinational approach to 5G networks. The current telecommunications equipment sector is a Huawei-dominated oligopoly. This presents a major supply chain and security risk, yet China’s state subsidies make it difficult for others to enter the market. The T-12 could support non-Huawei companies, such as Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung, as they transition to using an open radio access network, or O-RAN, which relies on open interfaces rather than proprietary equipment. This would allow multiple vendors to supply the market with interchangeable telecommunications components. In the future, it could collaborate on 6G alternatives to Chinese hardware well before they are necessary, helping avoid the very dilemma many economies are now facing with 5G.

The T-12 could also develop the framework for a digital currency that preserves the central role of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system. That role is under threat. China’s central bank is already piloting a digital currency program. If the effort succeeds, China is likely to extend its use to countries that participate in its Belt and Road Initiative, expanding the renminbi’s reach as an international medium of exchange and possibly threatening the dollar’s preeminent status. Pursuing a secure digital dollar-based platform would level this playing field, making it faster and easier to accomplish tasks such as moving money between banks, trading oil futures, and tracking money laundering.

Beyond this, the T-12’s members could develop and adopt a cyber-deterrence doctrine. The world faces a perpetual threat from cyberattacks, given the low barriers to entry and the difficulty of attributing an attack to a defined actor. To tackle the threat, the T-12 could lay out uniform standards for appropriate behavior in cyberspace and define what constitutes a proportionate response to a cyberattack. Members could cooperate in detecting and measuring attacks by increasing information sharing and establishing early warning mechanisms, then work together to attribute violations to a particular aggressor. And once a culprit is identified, the T-12 could coordinate a joint response.

ADDRESSING THE SKEPTICS

Objections to a T-12 are easy to imagine. The most obvious would be general opposition to any new international grouping, which would join a raft of existing multilateral organizations, some of which are obsolete. Yet the T-12’s novelty is what makes it relevant. There is no group of advanced democracies to coordinate technology policy: the G-7 leaves out important technology leaders, and the G-20 includes the illiberal states of China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. NATO is a military alliance focused first and foremost on European security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, with 37 member states, is too large and lacks the track record to break ground on technological issues. The T-12, by contrast, would bring together the right members while elevating technology to a level commensurate with such issues as European security and global economic policy.

The private sector’s role in a potential T-12 raises another question: Why would any business participate in a government-driven process? The answer is that it would make economic sense. Consider the inevitable restructuring and geographic diversification of supply chains that will almost certainly follow the coronavirus pandemic. Already, governments and firms are considering reshoring pharmaceutical and medical device production, and firms that are facing factory shutdowns due to the pandemic are rediscovering the merits of diverse supply chains. Multilateral coordination among national governments would make this process less disruptive, costly, and lengthy than it would otherwise be.

Then there is the likely reaction of China and Russia. Wouldn’t a new group of techno-democracies merely provoke them? Indeed, they probably would treat it as a threat, but the cost of forgoing cooperation among liberal democracies is far higher than the consequences of any pushback. As the COVID-19 pandemic has proved, when liberal democracies fail to work together, whether, in this case, in harmonizing travel restrictions, employing disease-mitigation measures, or assisting poorer nations, China benefits. The T-12 should not ignore illiberal states, and it can try to work with them on issues such as AI safety or technological responses to climate change. But it should tread carefully and limit their involvement. Ultimately, the world will be safer, more stable, and freer if liberal democracies stick together.

A final objection would be based on realism. Cooperation in other fields—global health, say, or economic policy—is hard enough, and the likelihood of building a successful body focused on technological collaboration may be low. Indeed, one should not overstate the degree of like-mindedness among any group of sovereign states, democracies or not. But that is a reason to experiment with new structures to deal with tough problems, rather than rely on either outdated mechanisms or an every-country-for-itself approach. The status quo is not sustainable. If the democracies fail to act, technology will help shift the balance of economic, military, and political power in favor of autocracies.

TIME FOR ACTION

In July 1944, delegates of the Allied countries came together in New Hampshire for what became known as the Bretton Woods conference. After discussions of various technical issues and sweeping foreign policy debates, the conference produced a blueprint for governing the postwar international monetary and financial order. The Allies agreed on a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, laid the groundwork for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and embraced an open international economic system. The framework designed then largely remains in place today.

Some of the most pressing technological issues facing the world’s democracies now may ultimately rival in importance the economic issues considered by the Bretton Woods delegates. Just as in 1944, when the United States and like-minded countries recognized that they could no longer make economic policy in a vacuum, today they must recognize that the time has passed when they can deal with the profound effects of technology on their own. For too long, national approaches to technological questions have been ad hoc, poorly coordinated, and left to technology experts to sort out. But in today’s competitive global environment, technology is too important to be left to the technologists.

**1NC---Impact---Democracy**

**Absent democratic coordination, autocracies win.**

**Cohen** and Fontaine **20** [Jared Cohen, former member of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. He currently serves as CEO of Jigsaw and is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain; 11-2020; "Uniting the Techno-Democracies"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/uniting-techno-democracies; KL]

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**Democracy solves extinction.**

Daniel **Twining 21**, PhD and President of the IRI, 10/10/2021, “America must double down on democracy,” https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/575693-america-must-double-down-on-democracy?rl=1, Marsh

Democracy is **under assault**. **China** and **Russia** are pursuing strategic campaigns to undermine liberal values and U.S. leadership. Authoritarians from Belarus to Burma brutalize their citizens to stay in power. The debacle of U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and our national soul-searching in the wake of the 20th anniversary of 9/11 led some to wonder if support for **democracy** should remain a component of **American** foreign **policy**.

**The** hard **truth** is that a world that is less free is one that is **less secure**, **stable** and **prosperous**.  The greatest **dangers** to the American way of **life** emanate from hostile **autocracies**. There are no quick fixes, but the best **antidotes** to the challenges of **great-power conflict**, **terrorism** and mass **migration** of desperate refugees lie in the building of inclusive **democratic institutions** — and working with allied **democracies** to sustain the **free** and **open order** that China, in particular, wishes to replace with a world that’s safe for autocracy.

The conventional wisdom that authoritarianism has popular momentum is wrong. No one anywhere is taking to the street to demand more corrupt governance, the adoption of one-man rule, a stronger surveillance state, or greater intervention by malign foreign powers.

Democratic freedoms are unquestionably under assault in many nations. Autocrats are aggressive precisely because of the growing demands for change in their more modern, connected societies — and the rising risk that middle classes in nations such as China and Russia will not be willing forever to forfeit political rights for prosperity.

American **retrenchment** and **isolationism** **compound the danger**. It would be nice to live in a world where failed states and dictatorships were a problem for someone else to worry about. But rather than producing stability, Western **retreat** only **emboldens autocrats** in ways that **amplify danger**s to American **national security**.

We know that violent extremism flourishes under state failure and dictatorship. Broken states become breeding grounds for extremist groups because they leave vacuums that terrorists are only too happy to fill. In nations **without democratic accountability**, citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often **violent** and **extreme**.

The good news is that we have billions of allies around the world: citizens on every continent chafing for greater freedom and dignity. They do not want U.S. military-led nation-building.  They want peaceful support for their independent efforts to create democratic space in systems distorted by overweening government control, dangerous governance gaps and foreign malign influence.

The free world cannot be neutral in the face of autocracy’s resurgence. Rather, it should play to its strengths. The **appeal** of democratic opportunity is a **strategic asset** for the United States — **despite** our own **shortcomings** — because people around the world similarly aspire to live in societies that guarantee justice, rights and dignity.

America’s closest allies are democracies. Democracies **don’t fight each other**, **export** violent **extremism**, or **produce** the **conflicts** that drive mass migration. Democracies are better partners in **fight**ing **terror**ism, human trafficking and poverty, as well as establishing reliable **trad**ing relationships.

Open societies **incubate** the **tech**nologies that will help solve the **world’s most pressing problems**, including **climate change**. Citizens can hold leaders accountable when they fall short, and democratic institutions are stronger than any man — as America itself witnessed after the assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6.

**2NC---Solvency---General---Cohesion**

**Solves coordination.**

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Finally, the T-12 could serve as a forum for **coordinating policy**. Members might **harmonize** their export controls on **cyber-surveillance** tools; regulate the use of **blockchain**, a **digital ledger** of global transactions, to ensure the integrity of **supply chains** when it comes to sectors such as **defense manufacturing** and **medical equipment**; generate **common standards** for a variety of **3-D printing** methods; and even **coordinate** their **education** and **immigration** policies to develop and retain **top technology talent**. More broadly, the T-12 should articulate a **vision** of the future based on **innovation**, **freedom**, **democratic collaboration**, and **liberal values**.

**Solves disputes and creates unity.**

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**2NC---Solvency---General---Follow-On**

**NATO**, the private sector, and other international organizations **follow on.**

\*Note. This may make the counterplan link to most net benefits\*

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The government leaders or ministers who meet as the T-12 would also have a **unique opportunity** to enlist the **private sector** and **international organizations** in their work. Annual meetings could serve as an arena for **business leaders** to join government officials in coordinating responses to emerging issues such as the need to improve remote-learning technology in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and what the future of counterterrorism might look like. The format for these meetings could include **issue-based** sessions, in which governments invite **leading private-sector figures** for focused discussions, or standing forums akin to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s Business Advisory Council, which provides advice to Pacific Rim leaders on concerns facing businesses throughout the region. The T-12 could also develop **working groups** and committees on the multistakeholder model, which brings together representatives from **business**, **civil society**, **government**, and **research institutions**. These groups would then pass recommendations up to ministers and principals. Simultaneously, leaders could collaborate with other **multilateral organizations**—working with **NATO** on **AI security**, for instance, or with the **O**rganization for **E**conomic **C**ooperation and Development on the industrial implications of **disruptive technologies**.

**2NC---Solvency---General---Info-Sharing**

**Solves info-sharing.**

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**2NC---Solvency---General---Innovation**

**Solves innovation.**

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**Coordinating investments** would represent another **natural function** of the T-12. Members could rationalize their allocation of resources to **innovation** and **R & D** and to securing **supply chains**. They could even make **concrete** financial commitments to counter China’s **Digital Silk Road** and **5G capabilities** and launch joint projects in such areas as **quantum computing**, **cybersecurity**, and tools for detecting AI-generated counterfeit images or videos known as “**deepfakes**.” In the realm of more speculative technologies, it could examine advances in **3-D printing**, potentially unbreakable **encryption methods** based on **quantum mechanics**, and **microscopic sensing** technology. More ambitious still, it might launch a joint fund to extend loans and loan guarantees to **developing nations** that seek trusted 5G equipment and **other technology** that accords with **liberal values**.

**2NC---Solvency---General---NATO Worse**

**NATO fails.**

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ADDRESSING THE SKEPTICS

Objections to a T-12 are easy to imagine. The most obvious would be general opposition to any new international grouping, which would join a raft of existing multilateral organizations, some of which are obsolete. Yet the T-12’s **novelty** is what makes it relevant. There is no group of **advanced democracies** to coordinate technology policy: the G-7 leaves out important technology leaders, and the G-20 includes the illiberal states of China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. NATO is a **military** alliance focused first and foremost on **European security**. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, with 37 member states, is **too large** and lacks the track record to break ground on technological issues. The T-12, by contrast, would bring together the **right members** while elevating technology to a level commensurate with such issues as European security and global economic policy.

**2NC---Solvency---General---Private**

**The counterplan draws in private involvement.**

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The **private sector’s** role in a potential T-12 raises another question: Why would any business participate in a government-driven process? The answer is that it would make **economic sense**. Consider the **inevitable restructuring** and **geographic diversification** of supply chains that will almost certainly follow the coronavirus pandemic. Already, governments and firms are considering reshoring pharmaceutical and medical device production, and firms that are facing factory shutdowns due to the pandemic are rediscovering the merits of diverse supply chains. **Multilateral coordination** among national governments would make this process less disruptive, costly, and lengthy than it would otherwise be.

**2NC---Solvency---General---Standard Setting**

**Solves standard setting.**

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**Setting standards** for the use of **emerging tech**nologies would be another **crucial job** for the T-12. The countries and companies producing the most advanced technology have a valuable **first-mover** advantage: they can set guidelines for how they expect their products to be used. Facial recognition software would be a good test case for the T-12’s potential on this front. This technology is already being used for surveillance purposes, including by the Chinese government to monitor Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang and by Moscow to link photographs with social media accounts. The leading democracies have yet to agree on rules for using facial recognition technology, including its proper role in the criminal justice system, or the protocols that should govern data collection. The T-12 could address this by exploring how such technology could be used to secure large events or assist in law enforcement investigations, but not as a means of social control or mass intimidation.

**2NC---Solvency---AI---FRT**

**Solves FRT.**

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**2NC---Solvency---AI---IP**

**Solves IP.**

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**2NC---Solvency---Cyber**

**Solves cyber.**

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Beyond this, the T-12’s members could develop and adopt a **cyber-deterrence doctrine**. The world faces a **perpetual threat** from **cyberattacks**, given the low barriers to entry and the difficulty of attributing an attack to a defined actor. To tackle the threat, the T-12 could lay out **uniform standards** for appropriate behavior in cyberspace and define what constitutes a **proportionate response** to a cyberattack. Members could cooperate in **detecting** and **measuring attacks** by increasing information sharing and establishing early warning mechanisms, then work together to attribute violations to a particular aggressor. And once a culprit is identified, the T-12 could coordinate a **joint response**.

**2NC---Solvency---Cyber---5G**

**Solves 5G.**

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As its portfolio grows, the T-12 should also take a **multinational approach** to **5G** networks. The current telecommunications equipment sector is a **Huawei-dominated oligopoly**. This presents a major supply chain and security risk, yet China’s state subsidies make it difficult for others to enter the market. The T-12 could support non-Huawei companies, such as Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung, as they transition to using an open radio access network, or O-RAN, which relies on open interfaces rather than proprietary equipment. This would allow **multiple vendors** to supply the market with interchangeable telecommunications components. In the future, it could collaborate on **6G** alternatives to Chinese hardware well before they are necessary, helping avoid the very dilemma many economies are now facing with 5G.

**2NC---Solvency---Cyber---Crypto**

**Solves crypto.**

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The T-12 could also develop the framework for a digital currency that preserves the central role of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system. That role is under threat. China’s central bank is already piloting a digital currency program. If the effort succeeds, China is likely to extend its use to countries that participate in its Belt and Road Initiative, expanding the renminbi’s reach as an international medium of exchange and possibly threatening the dollar’s preeminent status. Pursuing a secure digital dollar-based platform would level this playing field, making it faster and easier to accomplish tasks such as moving money between banks, trading oil futures, and tracking money laundering.

**2NC---Solvency---Cyber---Disinfo**

**Solves info-sharing.**

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**2NC---Solvency---Cyber---Semiconductors**

**Solves semiconductors.**

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The T-12’s agenda should similarly grow in ambition. Moving beyond its initial objectives, the group could branch out into securing the supply chains for **semiconductors**. Doing so would involve **multilateral export controls** on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and technology, an area in which the techno-democracies have a **significant lead** over China and others. As part of this effort, they could create an **international** chip fabrication consortium to move semiconductor production out of China and into a T-12 country and provide **shared financing** for the billions of dollars such a move would require. And as the world faces diminishing returns in the growth of computing power due to the physical limits of existing materials, the group could launch **joint R & D** projects devoted to a **new generation** of microelectronics that might **jump-start** an increase in computing power again.

**Info-sharing solves.**

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**2NC---Net Benefit**

**Now is key.**

**Cohen** and Fontaine **20** [Jared Cohen, former member of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. He currently serves as CEO of Jigsaw and is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain; 11-2020; "Uniting the Techno-Democracies"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/uniting-techno-democracies; KL]

**TIME FOR ACTION**

In July 1944, delegates of the Allied countries came together in New Hampshire for what became known as the Bretton Woods conference. After discussions of various technical issues and sweeping foreign policy debates, the conference produced a blueprint for governing the postwar international monetary and financial order. The Allies agreed on a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, laid the groundwork for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and embraced an open international economic system. The framework designed then largely remains in place today.

Some of the most pressing technological issues facing the world’s democracies now may ultimately rival in importance the economic issues considered by the Bretton Woods delegates. Just as in 1944, when the United States and like-minded countries recognized that they could no longer make economic policy in a vacuum, today they must recognize that the **time has passed** when they can deal with the profound effects of technology **on their own**. **For too long**, national approaches to technological questions have been **ad hoc**, **poorly coordinated**, and left to technology **experts** to sort out. But in today’s competitive global environment, technology is **too important** to be left to the **technologists**.

**Autocracies will win the tech race.**

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Since then, autocratic states have **caught up**. China is at the **forefront**, no longer a mere rising power in technology and now an **American peer**. In multiple areas—including facial and voice recognition, 5G technology, digital payments, quantum communications, and the commercial drone market—it has **surpassed** the United States. Leaders in **Cuba**, **Iran**, **No**rth **Ko**rea, Russia, Venezuela, and elsewhere are increasingly using technology for **illiberal ends**, following China’s example. And despite the United States’ remaining advantage in some technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor production, it has fallen behind China in formulating an **overall strategy** for their use.

Almost in parallel, the United States and its allies have stepped away from their tradition of collaboration. Instead of working together on issues of common interest, they have been pulled apart by diverging national interests and have responded incoherently to autocratic states’ co-optation of new technologies. Although officials in most democratic capitals now acknowledge the profound ways in which new technologies are shaping the world, they remain strangely disconnected from one another when it comes to managing them. Coordination, when it occurs, is **sporadic**, **reactive**, and **ad hoc**.

The liberal democracies are **running out of time** to get their act together: whoever shapes the use of emerging technologies such as AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, and next-generation telecommunications will have an economic, military, and political advantage for **decades to come**. But the world’s advanced democracies have something the autocracies don’t: a long history of multilateral cooperation for the benefit of all.

Because the issues are so diverse, what’s needed now is not more **piecemeal solutions** but an **overarching forum** in which **like-minded** countries can come together to hammer out **joint responses**. This new grouping of leading “techno-democracies”—call it the T-12, given the logical list of members—would help democracies **regain the initiative** in global technology competition. It would allow them to promote their **preferred norms** and **values** around the use of emerging technologies and preserve their **competitive advantage** in key areas. Above all, it would help coordinate a **unified response** to a chief threat to the global order.

**Autocracies are leading now.**

**Cohen** and Fontaine **20** [Jared Cohen, former member of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. He currently serves as CEO of Jigsaw and is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain; 11-2020; "Uniting the Techno-Democracies"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/uniting-techno-democracies; KL]

**AUTOCRACIES IN THE LEAD**

Washington has struggled to develop a **coherent vision** to guide its global technological role, but many autocracies have not. China, in particular, has recognized that the existing rules of the international order were largely written in a predigital age and that it has an opportunity to **write fresh ones**. Already, Beijing is pursuing this goal by quickly building **top-notch** capabilities and deploying them throughout the **global market**, especially in areas where the U.S. presence is **weak** or **virtually nonexistent**. In **Zimbabwe**, for instance, the Chinese AI company CloudWalk is helping develop a national facial recognition system, giving the local government a powerful new tool for political control.

But forward-looking efforts such as these are not solely unilateral. **China**, **Russia**, and **other autocracies** are already coordinating around a self-interested global vision. They are shaping standards for the use of new technologies in exclusive groups such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose members have agreed to collaborate on information security, robotics, and e-commerce, among other areas. They also work through global forums such as the International Telecommunication Union, where some of the same countries have supported international standards that facilitate unaccountable surveillance. Unlike many liberal democracies, quite a few autocracies have realized that technology, including the power to innovate, set norms for its use, and shape the institutions that decide how it will be employed, is not simply a niche functional issue buried in a crowded foreign policy agenda; it is a central element of modern geopolitical competition.

The United States, on the other hand, has been mostly **reactive**. China’s rapid progress in 5G, AI, and quantum communications has stumped multiple U.S. administrations. Washington has no easy answer to China’s so-called Digital Silk Road, an array of technological infrastructure projects to accompany the construction projects of its Belt and Road Initiative, nor does it have an answer to the country’s campaign to establish a digital currency. The United States and its allies have consistently struggled to define the rules of engagement around cyberattacks and have responded inadequately to the use of technologies by autocracies to oppress their people. U.S. officials often complain about Beijing’s dominance in technical standard setting and allies’ deferential attitude toward Chinese infrastructure. But they have had a difficult time changing the nature of the game.

The T-12 would help democracies regain the initiative in global technology competition.

This is a **multinational failure**. Liberal democracies around the world simply do not work together on many of the issues that should unite them. Their responses to autocracies’ abuse of technology tend to be fragmented. National interests diverge, disagreements among states arise, and nothing gets done. Within countries, paralysis often occurs as domestic authorities clash with their national security counterparts over how to deal with election meddling, disinformation, and hacking. Instead of pursuing broad collaboration, the liberal democracies have come up with a patchwork of discrete responses: Canada and France’s collaboration on an expert panel tasked with monitoring developments in AI policy, for example, or NATO’s pursuit of a cyber-deterrence doctrine.

The dispute over the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei’s 5G capabilities is perhaps the best example of democracies’ inconsistent response. Following Australia’s initial lead, the United States took a hard line against the company, banning Huawei components from its national 5G network and forbidding U.S. entities from doing business of any sort with it. The United States proceeded to insist that other democracies follow suit, even threatening to withhold critical intelligence from allies if they adopted Huawei products. Still, Washington remains **relatively isolated** in its opposition. Many governments continue to resist U.S. pressure, pointing out that there is no low-cost, one-stop-shop alternative to Huawei’s technology. Even **Canada** and **South Korea**, close U.S. allies, have **defied** Washington and are considering Huawei equipment for their 5G infrastructure.

The democracies have come up with a **similarly disjointed** response to Russia’s election meddling. Although the Kremlin has interfered in the elections of multiple countries, the problem has largely been treated as a national one, deserving of only a unilateral response from any given target. When Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, only the United States responded with punitive measures. Likewise, Russia’s reported meddling in this year’s U.S. presidential election has so far not produced any unified reaction. Compare that to the response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its poisoning of a former intelligence officer and his daughter in the United Kingdom. In those cases, the major democracies coordinated a joint response, imposing new sanctions and expelling Russian diplomats.

**It causes extinction---there are multiple scenarios**

Dr. Eric W. **Orts 18**, Guardsmark Professor of Legal Studies & Business Ethics and Professor of Management at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, MA in Political Science from the New School for Social Research, LLM from Columbia Law School, JD from the University of Michigan School of Law, BA in Government from Oberlin College, “Foreign Affairs: Six Future Scenarios (and a Seventh)”, 6/27/2018, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/foreign-affairs-six-future-scenarios-seventh-eric-orts/

7. Fascist Nationalism. There is another possible future that the Foreign Affairs scenarios do not contemplate, and it’s a dark world in which Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, and others construct regimes that are authoritarian and nationalist. Fascism is possible in the **U**nited **S**tates and elsewhere if big business can be seduced by promises of riches in return for the institutional keys to democracy. Perhaps Foreign Affairs editors are right to leave this dark world out, for it would be very dark: **nationalist wars** with risks of **escalation** into **global nuclear conflict**, further **digital militarization** (even **Terminator-style scenarios of smart military robots**), and **unchecked climate disasters**.

**Shoring up democracy solves every impact**

Dr. Joseph S. **Nye 17**, University Distinguished Service Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, January/February 2017, “Will the Liberal Order Survive?,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/system/files/pdf/anthologies/2017/b0033\_0.pdf

The order will inevitably look somewhat different as the twenty-first century progresses. China, India, and other economies will continue to grow, and the U.S. share of the world economy will drop. But no other country, including China, is poised to displace the **U**nited **S**tates from its dominant position. Even so, the order may still be threatened by a general diffusion of power away from governments toward nonstate actors. The information revolution is putting a number of transnational issues, such as **financial stability**, **climate change**, **terrorism**, **pandemics**, and **cybersecurity**, on the global agenda at the same time as it is weakening the ability of all governments to respond.¶ Complexity is growing, and world politics will soon not be the sole province of governments. Individuals and private organizations—from corporations and nongovernmental organizations to terrorists and social movements—are being empowered, and informal networks will undercut the monopoly on power of traditional bureaucracies. Governments will continue to possess power and resources, but the stage on which they play will become ever more crowded, and they will have less ability to direct the action.¶ Even if the **U**nited **S**tates remains the largest power, accordingly, it will not be able to achieve many of its international goals acting alone. For example, **international financial stability** is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the **U**nited **S**tates needs the cooperation of others to ensure it. Global **climate change** and rising sea levels will affect the quality of life, but Americans cannot manage these problems by themselves. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous, letting in everything from **drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism**, nations must use soft power to develop networks and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges.¶ China is unlikely to surpass the United States in power anytime soon.¶ Washington can provide some important global public goods largely by itself. The U.S. Navy is crucial when it comes to policing the law of the seas and defending freedom of navigation, and the U.S. Federal Reserve undergirds international financial stability by serving as a lender of last resort. On the new transnational issues, however, success will require the cooperation of others—and thus empowering others can help the United States accomplish its own goals. In this sense, power becomes a positive-sum game: one needs to think of not just the United States’ power over others but also the power to solve problems that the United States can acquire by working with others. In such a world, the ability to connect with others becomes a major source of power, and here, too, the United States leads the pack. The United States comes first in the Lowy Institute’s ranking of nations by number of embassies, consulates, and missions. It has some 60 treaty allies, and The Economist estimates that nearly 100 of the 150 largest countries lean toward it, while only 21 lean against it.¶ Increasingly, however, the openness that enables the **U**nited **S**tates to build networks, maintain institutions, and sustain alliances is itself **under siege**. This is why the **most important challenge** to the provision of world order in the twenty-first century comes not from without but **from within**.

**Democratic governance prevents multiple scenarios for extinction---apprehension creates openings for Russia and China to embed and authoritarian order, causing nuclear war**

Dr. Edward A. **Kolodziej 17**, Emeritus Research Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, “Challenges to the Democratic Project for Governing Globalization”, EUC Paper Series, Volume 1, https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/96620/Kolodziej%20Introduction%205.19.17.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

The Rise of a Global Society

Let me first sketch the global democratic project for global governance as a point of reference. We must first recognize that globalization has given rise to a global society for the **first time** in the evolution of the human **species**. We are now **stuck with each other**; **seven and half billion** people today — nine to **ten** by **2050**: all **super connected** and **interdependent**. In greater or lesser measure, humans are mutually dependent on each other in the pursuit of their most salient values, interests, needs, and preferences — concerns about personal, community, and national **security**, sustainable economic **growth**, protection of the **environment**, the equitable **distribution** of the globe’s material wealth, human **rights**, and even the validation of their personal and social identities by others. Global **warming** is a metaphor of this morphological social change in the human condition. **All** humans are **implicated** in this looming Anthropogenic-induced **disaster** — the exhausts of billions of automobiles, the methane released in fracking for natural gas, outdated U.S. coal-fired power plants and newly constructed ones in China. Even the poor farmer burning charcoal to warm his dinner is complicit.

Since interdependence surrounds, ensnares, and binds us as a human society, the dilemma confronting the world’s diverse and divided populations is evident: the expanding scope as well as the deepening, accumulating, and thickening interdependencies of globalization urge global government. But the Kantian ideal of universal governance is beyond the reach of the world’s disparate peoples. They are profoundly divided by religion, culture, language, tribal, ethnic and national loyalties as well as by class, social status, race, gender, and sexual orientation. How have the democracies responded to this dilemma? How have they attempted to reconcile the growing interdependence of the world’s disputing peoples and need for global governance?

What do we mean by the governance of a human society?

A working, legitimate government of a human society requires simultaneous responses to three competing imperatives: Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy. While the forms of these OWL imperatives have differed radically over the course of human societal evolution, these constraints remain predicable of all human societies if they are to replicate themselves and flourish over time. The OWL imperatives are no less applicable to a global society.

1. Order refers to a society’s investment of awesome material power in an individual or body to arbitrate and resolve value, interest, and preference conflicts, which cannot be otherwise resolved by non-violent means — the Hobbesian problematic.

2. The Welfare imperative refers to the necessity of humans to eat, drink, clothe, and shelter themselves and to pursue the full-range of their seemingly limitless acquisitive appetites. Responses to the Welfare imperative, like that of Order, constitute a distinct form of governing power and authority with its own decisional processes and actors principally associated either with the Welfare or the Order imperative. Hence we have the Marxian-Adam Smith problematic.

3. Legitimacy is no less a form of governing power and authority, independent of the Order and Welfare imperatives. Either by choice, socialization, or coerced acquiescence, populations acknowledge a regime’s governing authority and their obligation to submit to its rule. Here arises the Rousseaunian problematic.

The government of a human society emerges then as an evolving, precarious balance and compromise of the ceaseless struggle of these competing OWL power domains for ascendancy of one of these imperatives over the others. It is against the backdrop of these OWL imperatives — Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy — that we are brought to the democratic project for global governance.

The Democratic Project

For Order, open societies constructed the global democratic state and, in alliance, the democratic global-state system. Collectively these initiatives led to the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union to implement the democratic project’s system of global governance.

The democratic global state assumed all of the functions of the Hobbesian Westphalian security state — but a lot more. The global state became a Trading, Banking, Market, and Entrepreneurial state. To these functions were added those of the Science, Technology and the Economic Growth state. How else would we be able to enjoy the Internet, cell phones and iPhones, or miracle cures? These are the products of the iron triangle of the global democratic state, academic and non-profit research centers, and corporations. It is a myth that the Market System did all this alone. Fueled by increasing material wealth, the democratic global state was afforded the means to become the Safety Net state, providing education, health, social security, leisure and recreation for its population. And as the global state’s power expanded across this broad and enlarging spectrum of functions and roles, the global state was also constrained by the social compacts of the democracies to be bound by popular rule. The ironic result of the expansion of the global state’s power and social functions and its obligation to accede to popular will was a Security state and global state-system that vastly outperformed its principal authoritarian rivals in the Cold War. So much briefly is the democratic project’s response to the Order imperative.

Now let’s look at the democratic project’s response to the Welfare imperative. The democracies institutionalized Adam Smith’s vision of a global Market System. The Market System trucks and barters, Smith’s understanding of what it means to be human. But it does a lot more. The Market System facilitates and fosters the free movement of people, goods and services, capital, ideas, values, scientific discoveries, and best technological practices. Created is a vibrant global civil society oblivious to state boundaries. What we now experience is De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America on global steroids.

As for the imperative of Legitimacy, the social compacts of the democracies affirmed Rousseau’s conjecture that all humans are free and therefore equal. Applied to elections each citizen has one vote. Democratic regimes are also obliged to submit to the rule of law, to conduct free and fair elections, to honor majority rule while protecting minority rights, and to **promote** human rights at home and **abroad**.

The Authoritarian Threat to the Democratic Project

The **democratic project** for **global governance** is now at **risk**. Let’s start with the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes, with Russia and China in the lead. Both Russia and China would **rest global governance** on Big Power spheres of influence. Both would assume **hegemonic status** in their respective regions, asserting their versions of the **Monroe Doctrine**. Their regional hegemony would then **leverage** their claim to be global **Big Powers**. Moscow and Beijing would then have an equal say with the United States and the West in sharing and shaping global governance. The Russo-Chinese global system of Order would ascribe to Russia and China governing privileges not accorded to the states both aspire to dominate. Moscow and Beijing would enjoy **unconditional** recognition of their state **sovereignty**, territorial integrity, and non-interference in their domestic affairs, but they would reserve to themselves the right to **intervene** in the domestic and foreign affairs of the states and peoples under their tutelage in pursuit of their hegemonic interests. President Putin has announced that Russia’s **imperialism** encompasses the **millions** of Russians living in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Russia contends that Ukraine and Belarus also fall under Moscow’s purported claim to historical sovereignty over these states. Forceful re-absorption of **Crimea** and control over eastern **Ukraine** are viewed by President Putin as Russia’s historical inheritances. Self-determination is not extended to these states or to other states and peoples of the former Soviet Union. Moscow rejects their right to freely align, say, with the European Union or, god forbid, with NATO.

In contrast to the democratic project, universal in its reach, the Russo-Chinese conception of a stable global order rests on more **tenuous** and **conflict-prone** **ethno-national foundations**. Russia’s proclaimed enemies are the United States and the European Union. Any means that undermines the unity of these entities is viewed by Moscow as a gain. The endgame is a **poly-anarchical** interstate system, potentially as **war-prone** as the Eurocentric system **before** and **after World War I**, but now populated by states with **nuclear weapons**.

**2NC---Competition---AT: Do Both**

**Inclusion of illiberal states causes failure.**

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Then there is the likely reaction of China and Russia. Wouldn’t a new group of techno-democracies merely provoke them? Indeed, they probably would treat it as a threat, but the cost of forgoing cooperation among liberal democracies is **far higher** than the consequences of **any pushback**. As the COVID-19 pandemic has proved, when liberal democracies fail to **work together**, whether, in this case, in harmonizing travel restrictions, employing disease-mitigation measures, or assisting poorer nations, **China benefits**. The T-12 should not ignore illiberal states, and it can try to work with them on issues such as AI safety or technological responses to climate change. But it should **tread carefully** and **limit** their involvement. Ultimately, the world will be **safer**, **more stable**, and **freer** if **liberal democracies** stick together.